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In employment discrimination cases, supervisors are often
shielded from personal liability for their willful violations of an-
tidiscrimination laws. Consider Wilson v. Wayne County,' which
concerned nineteen-year-old Wendy Wilson, a police dispatcher in
the small town in which she had grown up,2 and Leon "Buddy"
Nutt, a fifty-five-year-old sheriff who had extensive service with the
Sheriff's Department. The town being small, Sheriff Nutt was
aware of Wilson's kidnap and rape at age eleven; he remembered
the incident first-hand, and believed that Wilson's psyche was still
damaged from the tragic event.' On a hot summer night, Sheriff
Nutt arrived at headquarters at approximately 1:30 in the morning;
Wilson was on dispatch duty.5 After Wilson mentioned that she
was running low on complaint cards, Sheriff Nutt asked Wilson to
join him in the office.6
Wilson followed, expecting to replenish her supply of complaint
cards.7 However, Sheriff Nutt locked the door and turned out the
lights; the surprised Wilson froze in fear.8 Nutt fondled her, and
placed her hands upon his body.9 Although Wilson did not resist,
she did not participate, and withdrew her hand when Nutt no
longer held it against him.' 0 Nutt then pulled her to the floor and
raped her." Wilson did not resist because her resistance to her
previous rape had failed.' 2 Wilson testified, "[W]hen you go
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to her grandfather, Gerald A. Vickers,
Sr., who in a different time, would have made an exceptional lawyer. The author is
also grateful to Professor Terry Smith for his guidance in the writing of this Note.
1. Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
2. Id. at 1256.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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through something like that one and it doesn't work.., when you
fight and it does not work.., you don't feel like fighting again."13
She explained further that she did not resist because the sheriff was
"in a position of authority. "14
Federal district judge Thomas A. Higgins found that Sheriff
Nutt's rape of police dispatcher Wendy Wilson constituted sexual
harassment under Title VII.15 Because Wilson settled with her mu-
nicipal employer, Nutt was the sole defendant at trial.16  Although
disgusted by Nutt's actions,17 the judge dismissed the claim against
Nutt in his individual capacity' 8 because the weight of authority
does not recognize individual liability under Title VII, regardless of
a supervisor's culpability.19
A split among the federal circuits has left individual liability
under Title VII in a state of disarray. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII or the Act) prohibits employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, color and national
origin.2 0  The Act further prohibits employers from retaliating
against individuals who oppose discriminatory practices under Title
VII. 21
Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers.22 Under the
Act, "employer" is defined as:
(b) a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
13. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. at 1257 n. 5.
14. Id. at 1257.
15. Id. at 1259-60. Defendant was found guilty of both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment. The court also found Nutt guilty of the retaliatory
discharge of Stevie Bums, a male co-worker of Wilson's who supported Wilson's alle-
gations. Id. at 1260-61.
16. Id. at 1256.
17. The court stated:
The fact that an eighteen-year-old girl wore shorts during the summer
months in Tennessee, wore a bathing suit on a canoe trip, and engaged in
non-sexual horseplay with a co-worker her own age should not be perceived
by even the most optimistic fifty-three-year-old man as a willingness to have
sex with him.
Wilson, 856 F. Supp. at 1260.
18. Id. at 1260, 1264-65.
19. Id. at 1264-65.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) [hereinafter "Title VII" or "the Act"].
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
22. For the purposes of this note, the term "employer" shall refer to the employing
entity, who pays employees and for whom all employees and supervisors are engaged.
The term "supervisor" shall refer to supervisory individuals who exercise at least
some control over employees' terms and conditions of employment. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 525, 1438 (6th ed. 1990).
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twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal-
endar year, and any agent of such person .... 23
However, courts are split over the intent of the Act's definition.
Are employer's agents, such as supervisors, personally liable under
Title VII;24 or does Title VII merely subject employers to respon-
deat superior liability for the acts of an agent?2 5
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits and numerous district courts hold
individual supervisors liable for Title VII violations, or rely upon
the existence of individual liability by declining to dismiss claims
against individual defendants for failure to state a proper claim. 6
The Second, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits hold only employers, not individual supervisors, liable for Ti-
tle VII violations.2 7
This Note examines the competing rationales for and against in-
dividual supervisor liability under Title VII, and concludes that su-
pervisor liability is the better reasoned view. Unlike other articles
that have endorsed individual supervisor liability for Title VII dis-
crimination, 8 this Note argues that respondeat superior liability
may unduly punish employers, and that individual liability will
serve to clarify when respondeat superior liability is appropriate
under Title VII. This Note further differs from other articles by
23. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
24. Hereinafter "supervisor liability" or "expanded liability."
25. Hereinafter "employer liability" or "limited liability."
26. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993) (allowing
individual supervisor liability); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989)
(same), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevant part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Weeks v.
Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515 (D. Maine 1994) (same); Johnson v. University Surgical
Group Assoc., 871 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same); Doe v. William Shapiro,
Esq., P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant
Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 786 (N.D. Ii. 1993) (same).
27. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995) (precluding liability for
actor who doesn't fulfil definition of "employer" under Title VII, absent statutory
specification allowing individual liability); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(same); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. den., - U.S. -,
115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's int'l., Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993)
(same), cert. den., Miller v. LaRosa, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). The Eleventh
Circuit has denied individual supervisor liability, but in cases involving public employ-
ers. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
28. Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability For Employee!
Agent Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39 (1994) (individual liability appropriate
on legal and policy grounds). See also Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Employment Dis-
crimination-Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.: Individual Liability For Supervi-
sory Employees Under Title VII and the ADEA, 17 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 143 (1995)
(same); Christopher Greer, Note, "Who, Me?": A Supervisor's Individual Liability
For Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835 (1994) (same).
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undertaking a comprehensive analogy to other federal discrimina-
tion statutes.
Part I explains how courts construe the term "employer" in Title
VII to either allow or disallow direct supervisor liability. Part II
discusses the rationales for and against individual supervisor liabil-
ity. Part III concludes that individual supervisor liability is the
better reasoned view, on construction, policy and comparative
grounds. Part III proposes joint and several liability for supervi-
sors and employers in all Title VII cases, which will clarify when
respondeat superior liability is appropriate under Title VII. This
proposal will deter Title VII violations, remedy plaintiffs appropri-
ately and protect employers from undue vicarious liability.
I. Title VH Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 196429 provides broad protection for mi-
norities and women.3 ° Title VII of the Act prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin,31 as well as retaliatory acts against employees who file com-
plaints of employment discrimination.32 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 expanded Title VII relief to include the legal remedies of
compensatory and punitive damages.33 Some courts consider this
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
30. John A. Tisdale, Deterred Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examining
the Limits of Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REv. 151, 154 (1984).
31. Title VII states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
32. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees.., because he has opposed any practice made an unlaw-
ful employment practice by this chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) states in pertinent part:
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 or e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination... prohibited under [this Act], and provided that the com-
plaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the com-
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relief to be specifically suited to individual supervisor liability.34
Prior to the 1991 amendments, only the equitable remedies of rein-
statement and back-pay were available; these remedies were gener-
ally assessed against employers.35
Seemingly irreconcilable policies combat one another under Ti-
tle VII. Title VII's prohibition of employer discrimination on the
basis of sex, race, color, religion and national origin,36 clearly impli-
cates the Act's public policy of eradicating workplace discrimina-
tion.37 Conversely, the Act's limit on liability to employers who
employ a minimum of fifteen persons, acknowledges the impor-
tance of small businesses to the American economy,38 and a desire
to limit government's intrusive reach into small businesses.39
As civil rights legislation, Title VII was designed specifically to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace; its stated purpose is to
"eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color,
plaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed
in subsection (b) of this section ....
However, these damages are limited according to the number of employees in the
employer's workforce. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) thus provides:
The amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not ex-
ceed, for each complaining party-(A) in the case of a respondent who has
more than 14 and few than 101 employees .... $50,000; (B) ... who has
more than 100 or fewer than 201 employees .... $100,000; (C) ... who has
more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees .... $200,000; and (D) ... who
has more than 500 employees . . . , $3000,000.
34. See, e.g., Accordino v. Langman Constr., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 237, 239 (1994)
(discussing effect of Civil Rights Act of 1991 in leading many courts to conclude that
Congress' addition of compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII created per-
sonal liability in supervisors); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-
80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
35. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing pre-1991 remedies as supporting employer
liability). But cf Cornwall v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming back
pay award against individual defendants).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
37. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2401 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401 ("the purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the utiliza-
tion of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based
on race, color, religion, or national origin").
38. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (at time
of Title VII's enactment, noting that small businesses constituted 92% of employers
and played a significant role in America's economic well-being).
39. See, e.g., id. at 13,085-86 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Cotton) (voicing concern that
small businesses that employ friends and family will be subject to excessive govern-
ment regulation); 137 CONG. REC. 18,336, 18,337-38 (1991) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)
(regarding 1991 addition of compensatory and punitive damages; voicing concern for
overall impact on economy if small businesses should be forced to litigate discrimina-
tion claims); id. at 3857, 3874 (1991) (remarks of Rep. Moody) (same).
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religion or national origin."40 By broadening Title VII's reme-
dies,41 Congress may have avowed its desire that the Act be con-
strued broadly, consistent with its remedial purpose.42 The express
purpose of these expanded remedies, which are especially well-
suited to individual defendants, is "to strengthen existing remedies
to provide more effective deterrence and ensure compensation
commensurate with the harms suffered by victims of intentional
discrimination. 43
On the other hand, Title VII manifests genuine economic and
commerce concerns by excluding employers with fewer than fifteen
employees from liability.44 This provision is the result of floor de-
bate on the burdens placed upon small businesses forced to comply
with federal regulations and to defend against a Title VII suit.45
Other factors considered were the protection of intimate and per-
sonal relations existing in small businesses; 46 Title VII's potential
effect on the economy;47 and the constitutionality of Title VII
under the Commerce Clause.48
Literally meaning "let the master answer, '49 respondeat superior
liability imputes liability to employers for their employee's wrong-
ful conduct.50 The doctrine holds a master responsible for the acts
that its agent takes without care, when they injure an individual to
40. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2401 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401.
41. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII allowed only the equitable
remedies of reinstatement and back pay. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 651.
43. See id. at 556.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
45. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,092 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Cotton); id. at 13,088
(Remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 13,092-93 (Remarks of Sen. Morse).
46. See id. at 6566 (letter from minority membership of House Committee on the
Judiciary) (discussing concerns that Title VII would inject federal government into
"partnership" with private business which would grant government "the power to dic-
tate hiring, firing, and promotion policies of business").
47. Id. at 7088 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (discussing breadth of Title VII coverage
to "businesses, industries, individuals, employment, and labor unions" and effect of
federal supervision of hiring, firing, promotion, compensation and the terms and con-
ditions of employment under Title VII).
48. Id. at 7207-17 (remarks of Sen. Clark) (finding erroneous the averment made
by some opponents that Tide VII specifically, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gener-
ally, were unconstitutional).
49. BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY, supra note 22 at 1311-12.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) [hereinafter "RESTATE-
MENT"](master. liable for torts of servants that are committed during the servant's
course of employment).
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whom the master owes a duty of care.5 1 Title VII is widely consid-
ered to implicate respondeat superior liability because the statute
imposes a duty of care upon employers to investigate and remedy
discriminatory conduct in the workplace. 2
However, circumstances may shield an employer from common
law respondeat superior liability. For instance, an employer is re-
lieved of respondeat superior liability if the relation of master and
servant does not exist at the time of the injury.53 This exception is
based on the notion that a master should not be liable for conduct
that falls outside an agent's legitimate scope of authority.54 Nor
are employers liable when the servant's acts are independent and
therefore "unexpectable" to the master. 55  Moreover, conduct
which is taken for the servant's benefit, rather than for that of the
master, falls outside the legitimate scope of the servant's authority
and releases the employer of liability for it.5
6
By hinging respondeat superior liability on the legitimacy of the
agent's authority, the doctrine implicitly allows individual liability
for actions taken without legitimate authority.57 Agents may be
held personally liable for actions which were undertaken without
the apparent, actual or implied authority of the employer.5 8 In ad-
dition, agency principles allow a master and agent to be joined in
one action, allowing a judgment against each. 59 The agency doc-
trine thus contemplates joint and several liability for tortious con-
51. See id. §§ 214 (failure of agent to perform non-delegable duty of master results
in master's liability); id. § 219(2)(c) (master's non-delegable duty mandates master's
liability for servant's acts which breach duty).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), see supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 481-82, 489-80 (1988).
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 219 (when master liable for torts of ser-
vants); cf RESTATEMENT, supra, § 221 (what constitutes relation of master and ser-
vant. See also RESTATEMENT, supra, Title B, Introductory Notes, at 480.
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 219(2) (master not subject to liability for torts
of servants committed while acting outside scope of employment).
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 229 (factors in determining whether servant
acted within scope of employment include whether master has reason to expect that
act will occur).
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, §§ 228, 235 (act must be committed in contem-
plation of some benefit for master for employer to incur respondeat superior
liability).
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 219 (master liable for acts of servant commit-
ted in scope of employment, but not liable for acts outside of scope unless master
intended conduct, acted recklessly, had non-delegable duty; or enabled servant's tort
by agency relation).
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 349C(1).
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, §§ 217B, 359C(1) ("principal and agent can be
joined in one action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent and
principle, and a judgment can be rendered against each").
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duct, against both agent and employer.60 Therefore "[p]rincipal
and agent can be joined in an action for a wrong resulting from the
tortious conduct of an agent or that of an agent and principal, and
a judgement can be rendered against each."'6 1
Whether respondeat superior is applied, and whether supervisors
are thereby excluded from Title VII liability, turns largely on
courts' construction of the Act. Courts refer to canons of statutory
construction to determine Title VII liability. These analyses begin
by interpreting the Act in accordance with the statute's plain
meaning.62 Where courts find a statute's plain language to dictate
an outcome, further inquiries into legislative intent and public pol-
icy are precluded, and the inquiry ends.63
However, courts divine contradictory interpretations from Title
VII's language. Courts which find statutory language to be ambig-
uous inquire into legislative intent, if a plain language interpreta-
tion will frustrate Congress's clear intention.64 Courts may also
look to similar statutes as a guide to interpreting ambiguous stat-
utes. 65 The more similar the language and policies between the
comparative statutes, the more likely it is that Congress intended
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, §§ 217B, 359C(1). See also Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1323-24 (Parker, J., dissenting).
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 217B.
62. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (in all statutory
construction cases starting point is language). See also Freytag v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (if statute is unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete except in rare circumstances); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611
(1989) (clear statutory language precludes further inquiry); Rodriguez v. United
States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (same). See also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRucriON [hereinafter SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST.] § 46.04
(5th ed. 1994).
63. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (plain
meaning of statue is conclusive "except in rare cases"); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Service v. Asphalt Products Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987) ("Judicial percep-
tion that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of
ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and
intentionally provided."). See also SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 62,
§ 46.04; cf SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra, § 46.01.
64. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (courts may look to
object, policy and design of ambiguous statute to determine meaning); National La-
bor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957) (same). See also SUTH-
ERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 62, § 46.07.
65. See Northcross v. Bd. Educ. Of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428
(1973) (statutes containing similar language and showing common "raison d'etre"
should be interpreted equably); cf. Thompson v. Mississippi, 414 U.S. 890, 892 (1973)
(comparing state statute to similar federal statute).
See also SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 62, §§ 51.05, 52.02, 53.02. "Habit
and caution seek the easy comfort of past decisions and shun responsibility for new
determinations. Thus new legislation usually ties to past experience and prior enact-
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the statutes to be read similarly.66 But unfortunately, these inter-
pretive tools have widened rather than resolved the split between
the circuits.
II. Title VII Liability: The Competing Rationales
By comparing the arguments for limiting Title VII liability to
employers and expanding liability to include supervisors, a princi-
pled choice can be made between the two. Both views rely on
principles of statutory construction, the proper scope of judicial au-
thority, analogous statutes, and competing public interests
arguments.
A. Arguments For Limiting Title VII Liability To Employers
In Tomka v. Seiler Corporation,67 a divided U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit precluded individual Title VII liabil-
ity.68 Carole Tomka, a travelling account executive recently
assigned to a new-accounts position, alleged that three Seiler Cor-
poration (Seiler) supervisors sexually assaulted her following a
business dinner, and that Seiler terminated her because she com-
plained of her alleged rape and threatened to pursue criminal
charges.69 Tomka further alleged that the assault was a continua-
tion of eighteen months of verbal sexual harassment at Seiler.7 °
Tomka asserted Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment
and retaliatory discharge claims against Seiler and three supervi-
sors.71 A majority of a Second Circuit panel agreed with Tomka
that the district court impermissibly dismissed her claims against
Seiler Corporation.7 2 However, it affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of the claims against the supervisors in their individual ca-
pacities, on several grounds.73
ment. Continuity of regulation and consistency of purpose is much more real than is
generally supposed." SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra, §§ 45.09-45.10.
66. See Thompson, 414 U.S. at 892 (state statute struck down where federal stat-
ute included significant requirement that state version did not); cf. Northcross, 412
U.S. at 428 (state statute interpreted similarly to federal counterpart where both con-
tained similar provisions). See also SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 62,
§ 52.02.
67. Tonka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1300.
70. Id
71. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1299.
72. Id. at 1299-1300 (reversing in part and remanding for further proceedings).
73. Id
1996]
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Acknowledging that "the plain meaning of a statute is normally
controlling," the majority noted that a facial reading of Title VII's
agent provision implied individual liability.74 However, it reasoned
that Title VII's failure to explicitly allow agent liability is disposi-
tive of Congress's intent not to hold individuals liable. 75  Thus,
Tomka was considered one of "the rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of the drafters. '76 Under such circumstances,
"it is the 'intentions of the legislators, rather than the strict lan-
guage, that controls.' "77
Bypassing Title VII's plain language, the majority was compelled
to interpret Congress's intentions. The majority relied upon Title
VII's statutory scheme and its remedial provisions to find that al-
lowing agents to be held liable under Title VII for discriminatory
conduct "would lead to results that Congress could not have con-
templated. '78 Basic but unspoken assumptions about the hierarchy
of public interests underlie the several inferences which the Tomka
majority drew from Title VII's legislative history.79
First, the majority reasoned that because Title VII's statutory
scheme excluded employers with fewer than fifteen employees
from liability, it was necessarily "inconceivable" that Congress
would allow liability to run against individual employees. 80 Con-
74. Id. at 1313-14. The agent provision defines employers who may be held liable
under Title VII as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such person .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
75. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315-16. But cf. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am.,
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ul. 1994), where the omission of plain language preclud-
ing individual liability was significant. The judge noted that the legislative history of
the 1991 amendments reveals Congress' knowledge of the practice of holding individ-
uals liable under Title VII: "[ilf Congress found this practice objectionable or other-
wise inconsistent with Congressional intent it surely could have voiced that opinion
directly somewhere in the comprehensive reports accompanying the 1991 Act." Id. at
1016.
76. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315-16 (citing Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. C.I.R., 930 F.2d
975, 979 (2d Cir. 1982)).
77. Id. at 1314.
78. Id. See also Accordino, 862 F. Supp. 237 (refusing to infer Congress's affirma-
tive desire to include supervisors within Title VII's scope because and refused to infer
Congress' affirmative desire to include supervisors within Title VII's scope because
"[b]roadening the sweep of Title VII is a task for Congress, not the courts"). Id. at
238-39.
79. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314-16 (rationale favoring employers without so
specifying).
80. Id. at 1314 (citing Miller, 991 F.2d 583). Prior to Tomka, Miller was leading
authority in precluding individual Title VII liability. Miller reasoned that Congress
decided to protect small employers "in part because Congress did not want to burden
1996] SUPERVISOR LIABILITY 807
gress's intention to exclude individuals from Title VII liability is
not apparent on the statute's face; however, the majority found
support for its holding in the statute's legislative history.81 Floor
debate addressed defense and compliance costs which some feared
would overly burden small businesses.8 2 The legislative history
also revealed an absence of any mention of agent liability.
8 3
The majority further reasoned that Title VII's remedial provi-
sions are intended to limit liability to employers via respondeat su-
perior.84 First, Title VII's pre-1991 equitable remedies of
reinstatement and back-pay were of a type that only employers
could provide.85  The majority also found support in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991's expansion of Title VII relief to include com-
pensatory and punitive damages.86 Although such money damages
are of the type that an individual could be expected to pay, the
majority reasoned that Title VII's calibration of damages to
workforce size indicated that "Congress contemplated that only
employer-entities could be held liable for compensatory and puni-
tive damages .... 87
small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims." 991 F.2d
at 587. Thus, individuals were also excluded. Id.
81. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314-16. But cf Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833
F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying summary judgment for individual defendants
who owned employer because employer met Title VII's statutory minimum of 15
employees).
82. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13,088, 13,092-93). However,
the majority noted that this concern did not directly support preclusion of individual
Title VII liability.
83. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 6566 (letter from minority membership of the
House Committee on the Judiciary) and 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (Remarks of Sen.
Clark)).
84. See also Schaffer v. Ames Department Stores, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 41 (D. Conn.
1995) (construing Title VII's failure to specify individual liability in 1991 amendments
and to remove "small entity" exemptions to disallow individual liability); Saville v.
Houston County Healthcare Authority, 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1524-25 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(same); Smith v. Capitol City Club of Montgomery, 850 F. Supp. 976, 980 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (citing the damage caps' failure to apportion damages between individual and
institutional defendants, the court was "convinced that the damage caps as they exist
indicate Congress' intent that a plaintiff collect damages from the employer [only].").
85. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314. But cf Cornwall v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.
1994) (back pay award against individual defendants affirmed).
. 86. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), supra note 33 (text of
amendment).
87. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315. See also Verde v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F. Supp.
1329, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1994), where claims against the individual defendants were dis-
missed because Congress did not specifically include supervisors within Title VII's
scope. "Had Congress intended such liability, Title VII would have expressly in-
cluded supervisors and would have discontinued the exemption for small employers."
Verde, 862 F. Supp. at 1333-34 (citing Miller, 981 F.2d at 588 n.2).
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Finally, the majority dismissed the contention that individual Ti-
tle VII liability was supported by the existence of individual liabil-
ity under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.88 Like Title
VII, Section 1981 is an antidiscrimination statute which is often in-
voked in employment related disputes. 89 However, Section 1981
covers only racial discrimination, while Title VII covers race, sex,
religious and national origin discrimination.90 The dissent noted
that Congress's alleged exclusion of individual Title VII liability
was undermined by the fact that both employers and agents face
unlimited civil liability under Section 1981.91 The majority dis-
missed the analogy:
[T]he fact remains, however, that we are concerned here with an
interpretation of Title VII, not [Section] 1981 . . . [s]ignificant
differences in the statutory enforcement mechanism, coverage,
and remedial provisions of [Section] 1981, as distinguished from
Title VII, reveal that the breadth of one statute provides no sup-
port for divining the intent of Congress in limiting the coverage
of the other. 2
B. Arguments For Expanding Title VII Liability To
Include Supervisors93
One example of a case advancing the position that Title VII con-
templates individual liability is Bishop v. Okidata, Inc.,94 which an-
alyzed Title VII precedent to allow individual supervisor liability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).95 In Bishop,
88. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
89. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
91. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1324 (Parker, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981); cf
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316 (Scheindlin, J., writing for majority and responding to
dissent).
92. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316-17.
93. Because no single case allows individual liability while adequately discussing
each of the arguments for individual Title VII liability, this discussion relies on two
model cases: Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416 (D. N.J. 1994), and Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
94. 864 F. Supp. 416 (D. N.J. 1994).
95. Id. at 422-23. Curiously, and perhaps significantly, the cases which allow indi-
vidual Title VII liability do not state their rationales as clearly or eloquently as
Bishop. However, courts routinely analyze Title VII precedent to interpret ambigu-
ous terms under the ADA. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Wiener Industries, Inc., 857 F. Supp.
606 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (analyzing Title VII liability to find that supervisors may be indi-
vidually liable under ADA); Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 835 F. Supp.
459 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same). But see Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 852 F.
Supp. 676 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (Title VII precedent precluding individual liability under
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plaintiff Cheryl Bishop asserted claims against Okidata and two in-
dividual supervisors under the ADA,96 alleging discrimination on
the basis of her cancer.97 The supervisors moved for summary
judgement, claiming that they could not be held individually liable
under the ADA.98
In determining whether agent liability was available,99 Judge Jo-
seph F. Irenas looked to Title VII for guidance. 1°° The judge found
no preclusion of individual liability under Title VII or the ADA,
and thus, denied the supervisors' motion to dismiss.1 1 Because
both Title VII's and the ADA's language are virtually identical, 10 2
the conclusion that agent liability is available under Title VII sup-
ported the same conclusion under the ADA. 10 3
First, the judge relied on the language of Title VII and the
ADA.1°4 Like Title VII, the ADA prohibits discrimination by em-
ployers with more than fifteen employers and their agents.0 5
Agents are generally considered to include all individuals possess-
Title VII and ADA); Dunham v. City of O'Fallon, 1994 WL 228598 (E.D. Mo. May
12, 1994) (same).
96. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 419.
97. Id. at 419. The alleged discrimination included: announcing her confidential
illness to others; passing her over for ten jobs; ordering her to return to work within
two weeks of cancer surgery; refusing her time to take chemotherapy treatments; de-
moting her; decreasing her salary; negatively commenting upon her cancer in work
evaluations; and failing to advise her of training opportunities. Id.
98. Id. at 422.
99. ADA case law, like Title VII, is unsettled on whether supervisors are subject
to individual liability under the ADA. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 422.
100. Id. See generally E.E.O.C. v. A.I.C. Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276,
1280 (7th Cir. 1995) ("courts routinely apply arguments regarding individual liability
to [Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA] interchangeably"); see also Jendusa, 868 F.
Supp. at 1010-13 (ADA case analyzed under Title VII authority).
101. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 423.
102. Id. at 422.
103. See id. at 423.
104. See also Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125 (supervisors may be liable as "agents" of em-
ployer); Cassano v. DeSoto, 869 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("read in the normal
way (that is, as a matter of plain meaning), [agent] provisions would appear to make
individuals.., as well as [the] corporate employer.., potentially liable." Any other
reading "explain[s] away the normal reading of the statutory provisions."). Id. at 538-
39.
See also King v. Ohse Meat Products, Inc., 1990 WL 254965 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1990)
(discussing expansion of "employer" definition to include supervisors who act as
agents of their employers); Kelly v. Richland Sch. Dist. 2, 463 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.
S.C. 1978) (denying dismissal of individual capacity suit where supervisor was "agent"
of employer/school district, who as "agent of the District, is also an employer and can
be held accountable for its violation").
105. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 422. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A); cf. Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5).
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ing supervisory authority. 10 6 The judge reasoned that "[t]he plain
language of the ADA ... indicates that 'agents' of those who em-
ploy more than fifteen workers are 'employers' and thus liable
under the statute. Supervisory employees are clearly 'agents,' and
thus the distinction between 'individual' and '[employer]' liability
should be abandoned in ADA cases."'
0 7
The judge also dismissed analogies between small employers and
individual defendants as support for limiting liability to traditional
employers. Judge Irenas stated: "[T]he court sees no inconsistency
in imposing individual liability on supervisory employees of large
employers while exempting small employers and their agents ....
[S]mall employers are exempted from the ADA because of the un-
due burden compliance would put on their financial condition."'18
In addition, the judge questioned why individuals should be
shielded from liability for their tortious conduct under the ADA.
Suggesting that excluding individuals from ADA liability did not
follow from Congress's exclusion of small employers, Judge Irenas
noted that "[i]ndividuals ... have always been liable for torts com-
mitted in the workplace, including indemnification of their em-
ployer where the plaintiff proceeds directly against the employer
under the theory of respondeat superior. '"109 Individual liability is
reasonable under Title VII because "the traditional theory was that
only the employee, and not the employer, was liable for intentional
torts such as those contemplated by [Title VII's compensatory and
punitive damages]." 110 The judge thus considered respondeat su-
perior to provide no basis upon which to preclude individual
liability."'
106. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 422.
107. Id. at 423.
108. Id. at 423-24.
109. Id. at 424.
110. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 424.
111. See id.; Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1012 ("Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the
Fourth Circuit cited any authority-by way of legislative history or otherwise-as
support for their assertions [that "agent" language was intended to incorporate re-
spondeat superior liability]."); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)
(joint and several Title VII liability against employers and their agents via court-or-
dered contribution makes individual Title VII liability conceivable).
But cf. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (dismissing complaint in individual capacity because
respondeat superior precludes individual liability); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. IUI. 1991) (dismissing suit against supervisor in his individ-
ual capacity because his actions were taken as surrogate for employer); Babb v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, 861 F. Supp. 50, 52 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (because supervisors




Additional reasons to support individual supervisor liability
under Title VII are offered in Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospi-
tal.112 Plaintiff Vakharia served for fifteen years as an anaesthesi-
ologist on the medical staff of the Swedish Covenant Hospital. 13
She alleged that an effort was made to force out three female
Asian anaesthesiologists, including Vakharia. 114 The department
chair relegated the Asian females to a lower or-"junior" class of
anaesthesiologists, restricted their practices, singled out Vakharia
for criticism and passed her over for promotion. 115  Vakharia
brought suit against the hospital, her supervisors, physicians and
members of the Board of Directors, in their individual
capacities. 1 6
Chief Judge James B. Moran denied defendants' contention that
Vakharia's complaints must be dismissed because individual liabil-
ity is not available under Title VII.117 He relied on a simple public
policy argument. 1 8 Noting that "Title VII always has served two
purposes: to compensate the victims of discrimination ... and to
deter discrimination in the future,""' 9 the judge reasoned that "to
conclude that personal accountability of supervisory employees is
unnecessary to reinstate victims or to award them their back pay is
to neglect Title VII's broader goal of eradicating discrimina-
tion. " z12 Judge Moran stated:
[I]f the people who make discriminatory decisions do not have
to pay for them, they may never alter their illegal behavior and
the wrongdoers may elude punishment entirely, while the victim
may receive no compensation whatsoever. That outcome is in-
compatible with the broad remedial purposes of the ADEA and
Title VII, which were intended to provide all "necessary relief"
and to ensure "complete justice. "121
112. Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
113. Id. at 772.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 772.
117. Id. at 786.
118. Id. at 785-86. See also generally Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1011 (arguing that
supervisory agents are included in -the liability scheme of Title VII because contrary
readings undermine the eradication of workplace discrimination); Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1319 (Parker, J., dissenting) (same).
119. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785-86 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
120. Id. at 785.
121. Id. at 786 (citing Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418). See also Dague v.
Riverdale Athletic Ass'n., 99 F.R.D. 325 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("It is inconceivable that
Congress could have intended to exclude from liability the very persons who have
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Judge Moran also pointed to Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 as support for agent liability under Title VII.122 The judge
noted that defendants may be liable under both Title VII and Sec-
tion 1981, even if the defendant is not the plaintiff's employer per
se. 123 Section 1981 allows individuals to be held "personally liable
for civil rights violations that they commit while working as agents
of larger institutions, provided that their individual liability is
based on individual acts distinct from institutional policy set by
their superiors.' 1 24 Individual Title VII liability arose from analo-
gous liability under Section 1981. Logically, "individual defendants
should be treated the same way under ... Title VII as they are
under Section 1981.)1125
These arguments, like those in Tomka, have been criticized by
opposing authority. Both views use similar terms and rationales to
support their divergent conclusions. For instance, principles of
statutory construction simultaneously support the "plain language"
of agent liability, 26 and the "plain language" of employer liabil-
ity.127 Similarly, judicial authority, congressional intent and public
policy are cited to support contrary viewpoints. Thus, the debate,
as currently framed, provides no conclusive guidance on the issue
of individual Title VII liability.
engaged in the employment practices which are the subject of the action. Absent
some showing that such was Congress' intent, this court must deny the motion to
dismiss."). Id. at 327.
See also Schallehn v. Central Trust and Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315, 1334 (N.D.
Iowa 1995); Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1011 (ADA case analyzed under Title VII ap-
proved agent liability on public policy grounds); Jeter, 554 F. Supp. at 952 n.20 (al-
lowing agent liability because excluding individual actors from liability "encourage[s]
supervisory employees to violate Title VII with impunity").
122. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784. See also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J.,
dissenting) (Title VII amendments attempted to draw "parity" between Section
1981's agent liability and Title VII); Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 423 (individual liability
for decision-making employees under Section 1981 supports agent liability under Title
VII).
123. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784. For instance, employment agencies are not an
employer, but who send applicants to potential employers, may be liable if they dis-
criminatorily refuse to refer applicants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). Under section
1981, any person who interferes with employment contracts may be held personally
liable even if they are not the plaintiff's employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
124. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784.
125. Id. at 785.
126. See, e.g., supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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i. Resolving The Split
A. The Better Reasoned View
The shared terms of this debate demonstrate that Title VII and
its legislative history provide support for both limiting Title VII
liability to employers, and enlarging liability to include supervisors.
Supporters of opposing views acknowledge the correctness of the
legal theories which the opposition applies, but disagree with the
opposition's application of those principles. Consequently, this
split must be resolved by analyzing the divergent authorities' appli-
cation of the underlying legal principles, rather than by analyzing
the statute's language. In order to discuss the validity of the ratio-
nales underlying the competing ideologies, we must determine a
hierarchy for Title VII's competing policy goals.
Ultimately, it is public policy that frames this debate; the statu-
tory construction, judicial authority and congressional intent ratio-
nales are merely by-products of public policy determinations.
Courts invoke rationales to justify their initial, if unstated prefer-
ences for certain social interests. Thus, all other rationales follow
from weighing the conflicting public policies.
The better reasoned view is that all wrongdoers should be held
jointly and severally liable under Title VII. Both supervisors and
their employers can be held directly liable for their violative con-
duct: supervisors, for their discriminatory actions; employers, for
failing to remedy a discriminatory situation which was created by a
supervisor. There should be no respondeat superior liability under
Title VII.
1. Public Policy Supports Individual Supervisor Liability
As previously discussed, Title VII implicates contradictory policy
goals. 128 On the one hand, Title VII's purpose is to eradicate work-
place discrimination. 12 9 America's desire to guarantee equal op-
portunity in the workplace is manifest in the Act's prohibition of
arbitrary discrimination. 30 Conversely, however, the Act excludes
small employers from Title VII liability.' 3' This exception implic-
itly recognizes that small business is crucial to the American econ-
omy and should be protected from crushing liability. 132
128. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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The seemingly irreconcilable policies implicated by Title VII can
be reconciled. Although the Act manifests commerce concerns,
Title VII is, in the final analysis, civil rights legislation which specif-
ically seeks to eradicate workplace discrimination.13 4 As between
the purpose of the Act and one of its subsections, the purpose of
the Act as a whole should control over the purpose underlying a
subsection of the Act. Otherwise, the tail will wag the dog: the
purpose of an exception will frustrate the purpose of the Act. This
becomes apparent if we compare the validity of deterrence argu-
ments for and against agent liability, to the purposes of Title VII's
limiting provisions.
Many argue that individual liability will not increase Title VII's
deterrent effect. 135 The strength of this rationale is its intuitive ap-
peal: it is sufficient that employers discourage discriminatory be-
havior for fear of being subjected to respondeat superior liability
because supervisors will avoid discriminatory conduct for fear of
being subjected to discipline or termination. Moreover, to infer in-
dividual liability into Title VII would, at best, increase deterrence
by applying principles of Title VII public policy, rather than Title
VII's actual language. Title VII enumerates specific procedures for
bringing private discrimination suits.136  Thus, courts may be
tempted to usurp Congress's authority by creating law via statutory
interpretation contrary to the plain language of existing laws.
However, a more detailed analysis demonstrates the merit of the
deterrence argument. The argument that supervisor liability will
not additionally deter violative conduct assumes that derivative lia-
bility routinely occurs, and that employees will refrain from dis-
criminatory conduct for fear of being subject to discipline for
causing derivative liability. However, derivative liability is not as-
sured.' 37 For example, claimants' complaints may be dismissed as
133. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 29-33, 40 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (employers have proper incentives to disci-
pline supervisors and thereby dissuade Title VII violations). See also A.L C. Security
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282 (acknowledging increased deterrence arising from
personal liability but questioning its value beyond deterrence value of employer
discipline).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(A).
137. See Bruce C. Smith, Comment, When Should An Employer Be Held Liable For
The Sexual Harassment By A Supervisor Who Creates A Hostile Work Environment?
A Proposed Theory Of Liability, 19 ARIz. ST. L. J. 285, 293 (1987) (discussing a sur-
vey performed by the Harvard Business Review in which only four percent of high-
level managers would express strong disapproval to a male manager who was ob-




the product of an oversensitive nature or mistaken impression. In
such cases, supervisors would not be penalized for claims that the
employer considers to be misperceptions. Moreover, an individ-
ual's discriminatory tendencies are not necessarily controlled by ra-
tional behavior. This is evident from the large number of Title VII
actions which arise in vicarious employer liability jurisdictions.
Those supervisors who violate Title VII despite their employer's
liability presumably believe that they will escape discipline by their
employers.
Ultimately, the value of increasing deterrence by imposing su-
pervisor liability outweighs the value of limiting Title VII liability
to employers. The increased deterrence which arises from supervi-
sor liability clearly supports Title VII's underlying purpose of erad-
icating workplace discrimination. The policies which underlie Title
VII's exclusion of small employers are secondary to Title VII's ba-
sic purpose. If the legislation's key purpose was to protect small
business and management, the subject of the Act would be limiting
tort liability to small businesses, rather than civil rights.
2. Statutory Construction, Judicial Authority And Congressional
Intent Do Not Preclude Supervisor Liability
Establishing a hierarchy of public policies demonstrates that
congressional intent supports individual supervisor liability. Once
congressional intent is determined from the overall purpose of Ti-
tle VII, judicial authority is limited to applying the statute consis-
tent with the intention of the legislation. The intention of Title VII
is to eradicate discrimination.138 Placing the limited intention to
cap liability above the underlying purpose of the Act itself exceeds
proper judicial authority because this reading contradicts the pri-
mary legislative intent to eradicate discrimination. Courts must de-
fer to the statute's main purpose.
More importantly, supervisor liability is not inconsistent with Ti-
tle VII's limiting provisions. Title VII limits liability to employers
and their agents employing fifteen or more persons; 139 supervisor
liability does not broaden that class to those employing less than
fifteen persons. Title VII also limits compensatory and punitive
damages according to workforce size.140  Supervisor liability
neither changes these limits, nor applies them to individual super-
visors contrary to the statute's face or explicit legislative history.
138. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
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Moreover, supervisors are not typically engaged in the small busi-
ness entrepreneurial activity that Congress sought not to discour-
age. 141 Because agent liability does not invalidate Title VII's
limiting provisions, supervisor liability is not inappropriate under
principles of statutory construction.
Even assuming arguendo that Title VII's plain language is un-
clear or contradictory, proper construction demands that the sec-
ond level of inquiry be legislative purpose. 42 The judiciary is
bound to interpret in accordance with Title VII's intended purpose:
to eradicate and remedy workplace discrimination. Individual lia-
bility furthers Title VII's purpose by personalizing liability for vio-
lative conduct. Thus, in order to comport with proper judicial
authority, courts must interpret Title VII to allow agent liability.
Some courts limit Title VII liability to employers because of
Congress's alleged silence on agent liability.143 These courts assert
that inferring personal liability creates law and is therefore an
abuse of judicial authority. 144 However, because respondeat supe-
rior liability is not specified in Title VII,145 employer liability for
the acts of its agent may also breach judicial authority. In fact,
agent liability may be justifiable while vicarious liability may not.
Support for agent liability can be found in the Act's inclusion of
agents within employers who may be held liable under Title VII.
146
Conversely, Title VII offers no direct support for, or reference to,
respondeat superior liability.147
141. In order to not discourage entrepreneurial activity, Congress excluded "mom
and pop" employers from liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)b. Such small businesses
rarely employ supervisors, but instead, are managed by their owners. Conversely,
large and mid-sized corporations are the primary employer of supervisory middle-
management. Thus liability for supervisors, who are generally not employed by entre-
preneurs, does not endanger the entrepreneurial activity which Congress' sought to
protect.
142. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158 (courts may look to legislative purpose once it is
determined that statute is ambiguous); American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 526 (same);
Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. at 288 (same). See also SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. §§ 46.01,
46.04, supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
143. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315 (reasoning that Congress would have specified individ-
ual liability if such was intended individual under Title VII); Grant, 21 F.3d at 652-53
(same); Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n. 2 (same).
144. See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (suggesting that individual that judicial read-
ings which infer individual liability do "not comport with Congress' clearly expressed
intent" in enacting Title VII); Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (same).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (including agents within definition of employers who may
be held liable under Title VII).
147. See supra notes 111, 145 and accompanying text. See also Bishop, 864 F. Supp.
at 424 (noting absence of explicit reference to respondeat superior).
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3. Title VII Is Not Limited To Respondeat Superior Liability
Proponents of individual liability argue that the wholesale im-
portation of respondeat superior principles into Title VII is an in-
valid application of judicial authority.14 8 Conversely, courts that
exclude individual supervisors from Title VII liability commonly
assume that Title VII contemplates respondeat superior liability.
49
Respondeat superior concepts are not expressly mentioned in Title
VII, 50 and Title VII's legislative history is notably devoid of ex-
press contemplation of respondeat superior liability.' 5
1
Assuming that respondeat superior is a valid Title VII liability
scheme, some courts apply the respondeat superior and agency
doctrines inappropriately to hold that respondeat superior liability
precludes supervisor liability. 152 However, under the common law
the respondeat superior doctrine allows for personal supervisor lia-
bility as well.' 53 Those courts that preclude individual liability on
the basis of respondeat superior liability forget that
Individuals ... have always been liable for torts committed in
the workplace, including indemnification of their employer
where the plaintiff proceeds directly against the employer under
the theory of respondeat superior.' 54
Moreover, limited applications of respondeat superior and
agency principles contravene Supreme Court mandates that courts
should look to agency principles in Title VII cases.' 55 In Meritor
Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 56 the Supreme Court stated, "Congress
148. See, e.g., Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. 1006; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dis-
senting). This contradicts the popular argument that personal liability is precluded by
Congress's presumed intent that respondeat superior liability be invoked. Miller, 991
F.2d 583. This popular argument for employer liability is often cited by courts pre-
cluding personal liability for supervisors. Id.; cf Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1008.
149. E.g., Grant, 21 F.3d at 651-53; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
151. See supra note 111, 145 and accompanying text; but see notes 80-83 and ac-
companying text.
152. See generally Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (individual liability precluded by respon-
deat superior liability).
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, §§ 217B, 359C(1) (allowing joinder of master
and servant and judgement against each). See also supra notes 57-61 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 423 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 51).
155. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
156. Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Courts are split as to
whether Title VII and Meritor (i) merely authorize joint and several liability under
agency principles, or (ii) preclude individual liability under respondeat superior prin-
ciples. See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316, 1320 (majority and dissent disputing inter-
pretation of Meritor agency language).
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wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance" in deter-
mining liability for sexual harassment under Title VII. 157 The High
Court also noted that "such common law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars, to Title VII."'1 58
Agency principles provide for individual liability for wrongful
acts taken by agents, where the acts fall-outside the agent's author-
ity.159 Employers generally do not authorize conduct that could re-
sult in employer liability, or reduce workplace efficiency. An
agents' legitimate scope of authority is limited to acting for the
benefit of the employer. 160 Because violative conduct can only in-
hibit the employer's interests, all supervisor discrimination neces-
sarily falls outside the agent's legitimate scope of authority.
Individual liability is therefore available for supervisors' discrimi-
natory conduct, regardless of the importation of respondeat supe-
rior liability into Title VII.
4. Analogous Federal Discrimination Statutes Support Individual
Supervisor Liability
Title VII shares similar language and policies with other civil
rights statutes, namely the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA),' 6 ' the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), 62 Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section
157. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; accord Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993);
Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802 (C.D. I11. 1994).
158. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
159. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
160. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 219(2) (master not subject to liability for
torts of servants committed while acting outside scope of employment). See also RE-
STATEMENT, supra, § 235 (servant's act not within scope of employment if act commit-
ted with no intention to benefit master).
161. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a) (1994) [hereinafter "ADEA"]. The ADEA prohibits
workplace discrimination on the basis of age. Protected claimants must be at least
forty years of age. Under the ADEA "employer" is defined as an employing entity
having at least 20 employees, as compared to Title VII's requirement of fifteen.
Like Title VII, courts are split on individual liability under the ADEA. Although
judicial construction of this statute is not dispositive, several courts have suggested
that the same construction should be used for both the ADEA and Title VII. The
Southern District of Florida held that "[t]here 'is no compelling reason to distinguish
between the liability coverage under Title VII and the ADEA.'" Weeks, 871 F. Supp.
515. See also Straka v. Francis, 867 F. Supp. 767, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (declining "to
hold that employees are per se immune from all personal liability resulting from their
individual discriminatory conduct or omissions under Title VII or ADEA claims");
House v. Cannon Mills, 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. N.C. 1988) (predicating personal lia-
bility of supervisors upon defendants' authority over employment decisions affecting
the claimant).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1995) [hereinafter "ADA"]. Both statutes define an "em-
ployer" subject to liability as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
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1981), and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section
1983).163 For example, the ADEA and ADA respectively exclude
from liability employers of fewer than twenty and fifteen per-
sons.164 Sections 1981 and 1983 similarly share policy goals with
Title VII. Section 1981 seeks to eradicate discrimination in the en-
forcement of employment contracts; Section 1983 deters discrimi-
nation by state actors.165 Analyzing the scopes of liability available
under other analogous statutes suggests that shielding individuals
from Title VII liability is inappropriate. 166
a. Individual Liability Under Section 1981
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 has been unanimously construed to
allow individual agent liability.167 Section 1981 provides a cause of
action for race discrimination which interferes with another's right
to make and enforce contracts.168 Section 1981 is regularly con-
who has 15 or more employees . . . and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A); Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 459, 462
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5), as compared to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) and
29 U.S.C. § 630(b)).
Courts are similarly split on individual liability under the ADA. Although the Sev-
enth Circuit has recently precluded individual liability, no other circuits have spoken.
A.LC. Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 (precluding individual liability). Supporters of super-
visor liability under the ADA reason that "[t]he plain language of the ADA... indi-
cates that 'agents' of those who employ more than 15 workers are 'employers' and
thus liable under the statute. Supervisory employees are clearly 'agents' . . . ."
Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 422. See also Schallehn, 877 F. Supp. 1315 (supervisors may be
personally liable under ADA); Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. 1006 (same).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1983 [hereinafter "Section 1981" .and "Section 1983"].
164. See supra notes 161-62 (delineating statutory exclusions under the ADEA and
ADA); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)b (excluding employers of fewer than fifteen persons).
165. See infra notes 168, 182 and accompanying text (statutory prohibitions under
Sections 1981 and 1983); cf supra note 31 and accompanying text (statutory prohibi-
tion under Title VII).
166. Supreme Court case law and canons of statutory construction allow for consis-
tent interpretation of similar statutes. See supra note 65-66 and accompanying text.
167. Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 472 U.S. 1028 (1985);
Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. den., 422 U.S. 1006
(1978); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 960 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 422 U.S. 1006
(1975). See also Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. 769 (citing individual supervisor liability in
Section 1981 claims to support individual Title VII, ADA and ADEA liability); Jeter,
554 F. Supp. 946 (same); Hanshaw, 405 F. Supp. 292 (same).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) states in pertinent part:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ....
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" in-
cludes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
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strued to apply to enforcement of employment contracts. 169 Sec-
tion 1981 assigns individual liability to supervisory "agents" who
violate their employer's implied or explicit institutional policy. 170
Section 1981 and Title VII seek, and are applied, to the same ulti-
mate goal: eradication of discrimination in the workplace. How-
ever, while individual liability exists under Section 1981, Title VII
claimants generally do not enjoy equal relief.17 1
Courts recognize section 1981 and Title VII suits as indistin-
guishable by allowing both statutes to remedy essentially identical
conduct. 72 Some courts that have held supervisors individually lia-
ble under Section 1981 for breach of employment contracts, have
also allowed individual liability under Title VII1 73 Consequently,
identical conduct may be actionable under both Title VII and Sec-
tion 1981. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Musikiwamba v. Essi,
Inc.,74 although "Section 1981 was not originally promulgated to
regulate the workplace ... it is now routinely invoked to circum-
scribe an employer's right to alter the terms and conditions of em-
ployment on the basis of an employee's race or national origin.' '1 75
Section 1981 supports Title VII liability for agents because the
existence of individual liability under Section 1981, and its absence
under Title VII would create an irrational distinction between race
discrimination prohibited by Section 1981, and color, gender, reli-
gious and national origin discrimination prohibited under Title VII.
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the
contractual relationship ....
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
169. See, e.g., Gunby v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 840 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1988);
Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1987); Musikawamba v. Essi,
Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
170. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518-19 (3d Cir.), cert. den.,
479 U.S. 812 (1986); Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784.
171. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. Cf Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1295;
Grant, 21 F.3d at 650; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
172. Both statutes remedy discrimination in the workplace by holding employers
liable for workplace discrimination: Title VII specifically, and Section 1981 by prohib-
iting interference with minorities' rights to make and enforce contracts. Section 1981
protects employment contracts by allowing individual liability for parties who inter-
fere with employment contracts. See, e.g., Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518-19 (decision
making employees individually liable under § 1981); cf House, 713 F. Supp. 159 (deci-
sion making employees individually liable under ADEA).
173. See, e.g., Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784-85 (supervisors may be held personally
liable under Title VII, Section 1981 and ADEA); Bridges, 800 F. Supp. 1172 (deci-
sion-making employees individually liable under Title VII).
174. 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
175. Id. at 748.
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Section 1981 allows race discrimination victims to sue and obtain
relief from individual agents. 176 This creates a distinction without a
difference, where the victims are in fact similarly situated. 77 Race
and gender discrimination victims suffer the same injuries to their
careers, earnings, self-esteem and potential. 178  Both are subju-
gated to another's irrational prejudices. 179 It is therefore irrational
to allow a broader scope of remedies to a victim of race discrimina-
tion in an employment setting, while limiting the remedies avail-
able to a victim of sex discrimination in an employment setting.
b. Individual Liability Under Section 1983
Section 1983180 also supports an argument for individual liability
under Title VII. 18 1 Section 1983 deters state supported discrimina-
176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. See also Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d
1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981) ("section 1981 applies to all types of racial discrimination,
public or private"); Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784 ("complete agreement with respect
to personal liability of decision making employees under § 1981").
177. Opinions differ on this issue. However, the legislative history of Title VII's
expansion to include compensatory and punitive damages notes:
An unfair preference exists in federal civil rights law. Current civil rights
laws permit the recovery of unlimited compensatory and punitive damages
in case of intentional race discrimination. No similar remedy exists in cases
of intentional gender or religious discrimination .... Gender and religious
discrimination may have different cultural or historic origins than racial dis-
crimination. However, it does not follow that Congress should differentiate
among them for purposes of the remedial scheme provided by federal law
for intentional discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102D CONG. 1ST SESS. 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 603 (1992). Significantly, proponents of the 1991 amendments made
"parity" between the damages available under Section 1981 and Title VII a goal of
those amendments. H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (II), 102D CONG. 1ST SESs. 24-30 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 717-23 (1992).
178. E.g., Sims v. KCA, Inc., 28 F.3d 113 (Table), 1994 WL 266744 (10th Cir. June
17, 1994) (same allegedly discriminatory actions stated claims under both Title VII
and Section 1981); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986) (same);
Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. 769 (same). See also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J., dis-
senting) (discussing similarity of discriminatory actions under Title VII and Section
1981 causes of action).
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, or any State or Territory .... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law ....
181. See, e.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing the
availability of government employer liability under Section 1983), cert. den., 484 U.S.
1027 (1988); Anela v. Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Turpin v.
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 449 U.S. 1016 (1980) (same).
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tion by allowing private causes of action against "persons" who de-
prive others of their constitutional rights while acting under color
of law.182 The Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social
Services183 held that the term "person" included both individual of-
ficials and municipalities for liability purposes,184 and that munici-
pal employers could not be liable where a supervisor did not
directly participate or authorize the unconstitutional conduct.' 85
Conversely, however, supervisors who participate in or authorize
discriminatory conduct can be held personally liable under Section
1983.186
Title VII and Section 1983 both prevent discrimination: Title
VII, by private employers; 87 Section 1983, by government and its
agents.1 88 Although the statutes regulate different groups of actors,
and although Section 1983 covers non-minorities as well,'189 both
statutes serve to protect specific minorities. However, the clear
existence of individual liability for public supervisors renders the
exclusion of agent liability for private supervisors confusing at best.
The logic of excluding private sector supervisors from Title VII lia-
bility where they cause "the deprivation of a federal right" is
questionable.
The fact that the two statutes target different employers is not
sufficient reason to apply individual liability under Section 1983,
but not under Title VII. Under Section 1983, government liability
is imposed, presumably because the government should be the
model employer. 90 However, the government employer's height-
ened duty does not lessen the injury derived from Title VII viola-
tions. Thus, the government's heightened duty should not shield
private supervisors on the happenstance that they are employed by
the private sector.
182. Section 1983 was enacted as a mechanism of private enforcement of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 665
(1978).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 690.
185. Id. at 691.
186. Id. ("local governments, like very other § 1983 'person,' by the very terms of
the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations").
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), supra note 23 and accompanying text.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra notes 180, 182 and accompanying text.
189. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for minorities and non-minorities for
constitutional deprivations arising under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (pro-
viding liability to any citizen of the United States).
190. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
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Nor should one believe the corollary presumption that, because
government discrimination is considered "worse" than private dis-
crimination, that private supervisors should be held to a lower stan-
dard than government supervisors. Even if public supervisors'
additional burden arises from an increased deterrence interest in
preventing government-sponsored discrimination, shielding the
private supervisor does not deter discrimination by public supervi-
sors. Nor does the need to deter government discrimination lessen
the same need as to private supervisors. Thus, absent a discernable
difference in deterrent purposes, public and private supervisors
alike should be subject to personal liability.
The only compelling reason for excluding private sector supervi-
sors from personal Title VII liability is the danger of inhibiting
managements' ability to function. Equal economic dangers of
management paralysis exist in both the private and public sectors.
Yet public supervisors function despite being subject to personal
liability, perhaps because they need not fear liability so long as
they act correctly. Similarly, private supervisors will be shielded so
long as their daily operations comport with Title VII. Increased
costs arising from this liability will be absorbed in the cost of doing
business.
Admittedly, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields public
sector supervisors from personal liability where the alleged depri-
vations of a claimant's constitutional rights are not "substantial."' 91
In order to be subject to personal liability under Section 1983, a
supervisor must deprive another of a clearly established constitu-
tional right.192 However, even assuming arguendo that the supervi-
sor has violated a constitutional right, he or she will not be liable
unless the deprivation was significant enough to cause actual injury
to the claimant. 9 3 This doctrine helps public supervisors function
despite the existence of personal liability, because they are not held
191. See Albright v. Oliver, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 807, 821 (1994) (affirming dismis-
sal of claim where petitioner failed to show "substantial deprivation" of liberty arising
from mere initiation of prosecution); cf Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599
(1989) (section 1983 liability for violation of fourth amendment rights).
192. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (affirming dismissal because
claimant failed to allege violation of "clearly established constitutional right"); Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (same, for failure to allege violation of sixth,
eighth, or fourteenth amendments).
193. See Albright, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 821 (failure to show actual injury arising
from insubstantial deprivation arising from initiated prosecution was fatal to section
1983 claim); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (failure to prove actual injury from
school suspension fatal to claim).
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liable for the legally insignificant acts which constitute the majority
of their duties.
Title VII defendants also enjoy defendant-friendly protections.
Although qualified immunity is unavailable to private supervisors,
Title VII similarly shields employers from liability where the al-
leged violation is not severe. In order for hostile work environ-
ment harassment to be actionable, the plaintiff's workplace must
rise to the level of consistently abusive.194 Occasional or "stray"
remarks, regardless of how distressing they may be, are insufficient
to establish a cause of action. 95 Thus, like Section 1983, Title VII
shields defendants from liability for conduct that is not substan-
tially violative of the claimant's rights.196 Private supervisors would
not suffer greater exposure to personal liability than do public su-
pervisors currently. Therefore, private supervisors are capable of
functioning under the spectre of personal liability, as do their pub-
lic sector counterparts.
B. The Clarifying Effect Of Personal Supervisor Liability On
Employer Respondeat Superior Liability
Despite its noble purposes and vast reach, critics increasingly
question Title VII's efficiency in achieving its purposes. 197 Some
commentators doubt whether Title VII has accomplished any alle-
viation of economic and social imbalances, especially for racial mi-
194. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (harassment must be "sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment") (citations omitted).
195. See id. at 63-69 (clarifying that harassment claims require more than stray re-
marks); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding Title VII cause of
action where stereotyping rose above level of mere stray remarks).
196. See, e.g., Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1995) (that
individual defendant threatened to get rid of "the cunt in the office" was insufficient
to support finding discriminatory animus); Kriss v. Sprint Communications Co., 58
F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (isolated epithets and insults were rude, but not proof of
discrimination); Alvarado v. Health Net, Inc., 21 F.3d 1111 (Table), 1994 WL 141271
(9th Cir. April 19, 1994) (two comments did not establish racially hostile work envi-
ronment); Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n., 14 F.3d 526 (10th Cir. 1994) (age-
related comments by chief executive officer and personnel supervisor did not estab-
lish age discrimination).
197. E.g., William Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 507, 548 (1968) (economics models denying discrimination in markets militate
against antidiscrimination legislations); cf. John J. Donahue, Is Title VII Efficient, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (1986) (economic models establishing efficiency of Title
VII in driving out employment discrimination due to higher transaction costs).
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norities.198 Others argue that Title VII causes more harm than
good to the goal of eliminating employment discrimination. 199 Per-
haps the only consensus is that workplace discrimination persists
despite over 30 years of Title VII enforcement.
Perhaps Title VII would be more effective if liability was consis-
tent among the Act's several causes of action. Consider sex dis-
crimination: courts apply separate standards of liability for hostile
environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment causes of action
under Title VII.z° This causes inconsistent outcomes, reducing Ti-
tle VII's usefulness z.2 0  "[T]he result is a standardless discretion
that is problematic for interpreting a national employment discrim-
ination statute for which predictability surely has some value ' 2°2 A
consistent standard of liability is necessary to allow Title VII to
fulfil its promise of eradicating discrimination in the workplace.
A unified and consistent scheme that confers upon employers
and supervisors liability for their own actions will better effectuate
Title VII's purposes. Individual liability enhances Title VII's effec-
tiveness by attaching a high degree of personal risk to supervisors'
discriminatory actions. Supervisors are often perceived as role
models due to their supervisory authority. Thus, punishing super-
visors for unlawful conduct has a "rock in a pond" effect: their lia-
bility reverberates through the company, clearly showing such
conduct to be unlawful, and punishable.
Moreover, individual liability which is severable from employer
liability, will also protect employers from undue vicarious liability
in situations where the employer has acted responsibly toward the
discriminatory condition. Currently, employers are held strictly li-
198. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL-THE PERMA-
NENCE OF RACISM (1992) (short stories by civil rights legal scholar, considering ra-
cism's prevalence despite 30 years of Title VII enforcement).
199. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (free markets eventually eliminate em-
ployment discrimination, thus legislation encumbers process to detriment of would-be
beneficiaries); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 349 (1993) (arguing success of an-
tidiscrimination laws and that even if unsuccessful, repeal would result in social
disaster).
200. Rachel E. Lutner, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment. The Morass of
Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L.REv. 589 (1993) (varying
liability standards for hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment, increasing
strict liability for racial discrimination claims).
201. See id. at 593.
202. Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Prin-
ciples: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1229, 1232 (1991).
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able for quid pro quo Title VII violations committed by their su-
pervisors. °3 Fairness requires, however, that the employer who is
not notified of violative conduct, or who aggressively fulfills his
duty to investigate and alleviate the discriminatory condition,
should not be held liable.2°4 An employer's duty must end
somewhere.
The greatest impact of joint and several liability would be on
hostile work environment cases. Since quid pro quo cases impute
strict liability to employers,205 little conflict arises between the in-
terests of the guilty supervisor and his or her employer. Little rea-
son exists for employers to attempt to avoid respondeat superior
liability by strenuously asserting the innocence of a guilty supervi-
sor.20 6 Moreover, counsel who represents both parties has no mo-
tive to sacrifice representation of the supervisor for the benefit of
the employer.2 °7
However, hostile work environment cases present greater oppor-
tunities for conflicts to arise between multiple defendants.20 8
203. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (distinguishing between strict liability quid pro
quo claims and "knew/should have known" standard used to determine employer lia-
bility in hostile environment claims); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178,
183, 185-86 (6th Cir.) (describing strict liability standard applied in quid pro quo har-
assment claims), cert. den., 506 U.S. 1041 (1992).
204. See generally Smith, supra note 137 at 321.
205. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 183, 185-86.
206. This is because the standard for employer liability in quid pro quo cases re-
quires only a finding that the supervisor committed quid pro quo harassment. Such a
finding will turn on the factual record and testimony of the parties. The assertions of
the employer, who was not a party to the conduct, are generally irrelevant. See Kauff-
man, 970 F.2d at 183, 185-86 (summary judgment for plaintiff denied in quid pro quo
claim despite employer's dismissal of supervisor; factual record was incomplete).
See also Walker v. MacFrugal's Bargains, Closeouts, Inc., 1994 WL 693387 (E.D.
La. Dec. 9, 1994) (quid pro quo claim survived summary judgment motion on factual
record supported by testimony, rather than due to employer's discipline of supervi-
sor); Gardinella v. General Electric Co., 833 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (summary
judgment for defendant denied in quid pro quo action due to plaintiff's compelling
deposition testimony, and in spite of employer's failure to take adverse employment
action against plaintiff).
207. Although dual representation problems most often arise in criminal cases, the
potential of unequal representation is no less problematic in the civil context. See
generally United States v. Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn.) (attorney disqualified
from representing one defendant at trial where two codefendants had interest that
were adverse to those of single defendant), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982). Cf. gen-
erally Clemmer v. Enron Corp., 1995 WL 334372 (S.D. Texas March 27, 1995)
(ADEA claim where employer was denied summary judgment but no summary judg-
ment motion was made for individual defendants joined in action whose interests
were arguably adverse to that of employer).
208. See generally Douglas L. Williams, Individual Liability and Defending Individ-
ual Co-Defendants, C463 ALI-ABA 205 (1989) (discussing conflict of interest that can
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Where respondeat superior liability exists absent individual liabil-
ity, the employer may erroneously assert the supervisor's inno-
cence in order to avoid respondeat superior liability.209 In Meritor,
the Court declined "to issue a definitive rule on employer liabil-
ity."'210 The consequence of Meritor's vagueness is that, more often
than not, a finding of Title VII discrimination will be imputed to
the employer.21'
The application of joint and several individual liability would ra-
tionalize the application of respondeat superior liability under Title
VII. Such liability would clarify the debate of when an employee's
conduct should be imputed to the employer. Under the current
state of the law,212 courts may be forced to decide between imput-
ing liability to the employer, or finding no liability at all.213 Courts
may prefer to impute liability to a deep pocket, rather than leave
the victim uncompensated due to the unavailability of individual
Title VII liability.21 4 The existence of individual Title VII liability
would remove pressure from courts to unduly impute liability to
employers.
Severable employer and supervisor liability does not, however,
shield employers from their rightful liability. Where employers are
apprised of the discriminatory conduct, but fail to attempt to allevi-
arise in concurrent representation of supervisor and employer in employment
actions).
209. See generally Pratt v. Brown Machine Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (6th Cir.
1988) (employer publicly denied supervisor's culpability in criminal act but admitted
the supervisor's guilt in private, presumably to avoid respondeat superior liability for
state tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress). See also generally Wil-
liams, supra note 208 (discussing conflicts of interest which arise from concurrent rep-
resentation of supervisors and employers).
210. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
211. See generally Lutner, supra note 200 (discussing the "catch-all" respondeat su-
perior Title VII liability that arose from Meritor); Katherine Vorwerk, Note, The For-
gotten Interest Group: Reforming Title VII To Address The Concerns of Workers While
Eliminating Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1019 (1995) (discussing how 1991
additions of compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII remedies increased in-
centive for employers to avoid liability).
This proposition is further supported by the availability to employers of insurance
against discrimination claims. If employer liability were the exception rather than the
norm, no such market would exist for such policies. See generally Sean W. Gallagher,
Note, The Public Policy Exclusion And Insurance For Intentional Employment Dis-
crimination, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 1256 (1994).
212. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (dismissing claims against individual defend-
ants, leaving only employer as potential defendant; however, claims against employer
were dismissed as time-barred).
214. See id. and accompanying text. See also Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785-86 (dis-
cussing danger that lack of individual liability will leave victims uncompensated).
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ate the situation, employers could themselves be held liable. This
standard holds employers directly liable for their own negligent or
reckless failure to remove violative conditions. 2 " Moreover, em-
ployers would still be liable for failing to perform their threshold
duties under Title VII: to institute and post antidiscrimination poli-
cies, and to investigate and remove discriminatory conduct.2 16
In applying joint and several liability to both hostile environment
or quid pro quo discrimination, victims would bear the threshold
responsibility of notifying the perpetrator and a superior official of
her discomfort.2 17 However, the perpetrator may be the highest, or
only authority to whom the victim could report such conduct. In
such cases, the notice requirement would be fulfilled by the em-
ployee's giving either actual or constructive notice to the employer.
Where the supervisor responsible for investigating discrimina-
tion claims is not the perpetrator, the employee would be required
to notify the company's "watchdog" supervisor, thus giving the
company an opportunity to act. Constructive notice would also al-
low employer liability, but under circumstances where the perpe-
trator is the "watchdog" supervisor, or is the highest official within
the company. By giving actual notice of her discomfort to the per-
petrator, the employee would constructively notify the company as
well.
Admittedly, under this scheme some plaintiffs may be under
compensated because the individual perpetrator has insufficient as-
sets to pay damages. However, this result should not occur unless
the plaintiff has failed to notify the company, or if the company
received notice and acted adequately in response. Where the
claimant failed to give notice, the company should not be held lia-
ble. Alternatively, where the company responded adequately, it
fulfilled its responsibility and should not be held liable. Although
the insolvency of a supervisor may unfortunately sometimes pre-
clude relief, this contingency is not sufficient to place liability
where it does not belong. To hold employers liable simply because
215. See generally Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment: Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817
(1994) (discussing application of a negligence/notice tort standard for imputing liabil-
ity to corporate employers under Title VII).
216. See, e.g., Haskins v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 811 F. Supp. 534 (D. Or.
1992); E.E.O.C. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D. Minn.
1980).
217. For a general discussion of notice liability standards in employment discrimi-
nation claims, see J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability In Employment Discrimination
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relief is unavailable from the source of the conduct gives undue
windfalls to plaintiffs. The point of Title VII is not exclusively to
make plaintiffs whole; rather, it is to eliminate discriminatory con-
duct. This is best achieved by holding all wrongdoers jointly and
severally liable.
Conclusion
An examination of relevant legislative history, analogous stat-
utes and the broad purposes of Title VII reveal that allowing per-
sonal liability for culpable individuals is supported by the Act.
Accrual of joint and several liability to both employers and super-
visors will more efficiently accomplish Title VII's deterrent pur-
poses, while shielding employers from undue vicarious liability.
Holding supervisors liable for their own discriminatory conduct
will increase Title VII's deterrent effect by preventing further un-
lawful conduct by culpable supervisors, and by sending a strong
message to others that such conduct is personally dangerous. Im-
posing a regime of joint and several liability shields employers who
have responded correctly from undue liability, while applying lia-
bility to those employers who have failed to act to alleviate the
unlawful condition.
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